The CRA and subprime lending by Community Affairs Office
ISSUE 1 2009 Perspectives
Banking and Community
FEdEral rESErvE Bank oF dallaS




“T he available  
evidence … does not 
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argument that CRA is to 
blame for causing the 
subprime loan crisis.”  
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Amid the current economic turmoil, fingers are pointing in all directions. What 
was responsible for the subprime mortgage debacle, which set off a chain of events that 
led to a financial crisis of global and historic proportions?
Many are blaming the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), alleging that it required 
banks to make risky mortgage loans to low- and moderate-income people and neighbor-
hoods.
The CRA, passed in 1977, followed similar laws enacted to reduce discrimination in 
credit and housing markets, including the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975.
The CRA encourages depository institutions to meet the credit needs of the communi-
ties in which they operate—including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods—in a 
manner consistent with safe and sound banking operations. To enforce this statute, four 
federal regulatory agencies examine banking institutions for CRA compliance.
In the interest of separating fact from fiction, the Federal Reserve did its own re-
search and found that the CRA is unequivocally not to blame for the housing market’s 
fall. The numbers just don’t add up. 
To advance the conversation on how to build a stronger, more stable and inclusive 
financial system, we present “The CRA and Subprime Lending: Discerning the  
Difference,” an overview based on recent data.
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The CRA and Subprime Lending: 
Discerning the Difference
T he Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) has been under much scrutiny amid 
the subprime lending bust. Critics of the CRA 
contend that the law pushed banking institu-
tions to undertake high-risk mortgage lending. 
A Federal Reserve Board staff analysis finds 
that the CRA was neither a source nor driver of 
the housing market’s collapse.1
All parties in the housing market—from 
consumers to mortgage brokers, credit rating 
agencies, banks, insurance companies and 
investors—had a hand in the crisis when they 
miscalculated risk and lost sight of the basic 
principles of responsibility, accountability and 
transparency. In total, their decisions created a 
perfect storm.
This perfect storm also exposed the 
inadequacies of home mortgage regulation and 
how strictly it was enforced. The late Federal 
Reserve Board Governor Edward Gramlich 
cited the “hole in the supervisory safety net,” 
pointing out that banks and thrifts are subject 
to federal regulation, their subsidiaries and af-
filiates are lightly supervised, and independent 
mortgage companies are not supervised at all 
on the federal level.2
We examine the CRA and its role in 
the mortgage market and distinguish it from 
causes of the subprime failure.
CRA: An Overview 
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 
was created to combat redlining, a practice in 
which banks would not offer credit to specific 
neighborhoods regardless of residents’ credit-
worthiness. These neighborhoods were redlined 
largely because of residents’ race, ethnicity, 
income or a combination of these factors. 
The CRA requires federally regulated and 
insured financial institutions to show they are 
lending and investing throughout their assess-
ment areas, which are defined by the banks as 
areas in which they accept deposits and make 
a majority of their loans.3 One of the main prin-
ciples behind the CRA is that banks and thrifts 
benefit from the deposits of low- and moderate-
income households; in return, they should open 
access to credit in these communities. 
By opening access, the CRA enables cred-
itworthy low- and moderate-income individuals 
to become part of the financial mainstream. 
Since its passage, the CRA has leveraged an esti-
mated $4.5 trillion in these communities and 
helped to create jobs, develop small businesses 
and make mortgages accessible.4
In 1998, CRA-regulated institutions 
extended $172 billion in small-business and 
small-farm loans; in 2007, they almost doubled 
that amount to $342 billion. Their community 
development lending quadrupled over this 
period from $16 billion to $64 billion.5 The 
loan amounts do not include other community 
development loans, investments and services 
by public and private institutions that are not 
required to follow the CRA.
In a Federal Reserve survey of CRA-
covered financial institutions, most reported 
that CRA lending was profitable or marginally 
profitable. And, when banks have tested CRA 
special lending programs, most have reported 
low delinquency rates and net charge-off rates.6
How the CRA Works
Banks’ lending records are evaluated 
under the CRA. If a potential borrower applies 
for a loan for a house, small business, small 
farm or other purpose, the bank is required to 
examine the applicant’s creditworthiness and 
determine if it can extend a loan in a safe and 
sound manner. 
The performance context for each bank is 
different and is a function of the local econo-
my and a bank’s branching structure, business 
plan, community needs, financial condition 
and other factors.
A bank’s compliance with CRA require-
ments is evaluated by its regulator, which 
assigns a rating of substantial noncompliance, 
needs to improve, satisfactory or outstanding. 
A bank can build goodwill with the 
community through a strong CRA rating. But, 
fundamentally, a bank has an incentive to earn 
at least a satisfactory rating because falling be-
low that level may result in the denial or delay 
of applications to open a new branch, merge 
with another lending institution or expand in 
other ways. 
If a regulator has reason to believe that a 
creditor has engaged in a pattern or practice 
of discrimination under the Equal Credit  
Opportunity Act, the regulator is required by 
the statute to refer the matter to the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ). Housing-related 
discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing 
Act that does not involve a pattern or prac-
tice, and is not referred to the DOJ, must be 
referred to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.
A regulator does not specify which or 
how many loans, investments or services a 
bank has to make under the CRA. It assesses 
local economic and market conditions that 
might affect the bank’s income and the geo-
graphic distribution of its lending, identifies the 
number and dollar amount of loans to lower-
income borrowers or areas, and then judges 
the bank’s performance relative to its context.7 4 Banking and Community  Perspectives                                                                              Federal reserve Bank oF dallas
Table 1
Subprime Mortgages At a Glance
Characteristic  Total  Adjustable rate  Fixed rate
Number of loans    3,542,728    2,274,513    1,268,215
Average balance (dollars)   181,347    199,621    148,573
Average loan age (months)   26    22    33
Average FICO    621   617   628
FICO < 580 (percent)    24.2    25.4   22.0
580 ≤ FICO < 620 (percent)   25.6    26.9   23.3
620 ≤ FICO < 700 (percent)   40.3   39.7   41.4
700 ≥ FICO (percent)   9.9   8.0   13.3
Percent with second lien   22.3   29.9   8.7
Percent with loan to value (LTV) > 90 percent   35.9   43.3   22.6
Percent with prepayment penalty (PPP)   72.6   74.4   69.4
Average PPP term (months)   30   26   37
Percent full documentation   66.4   62.4   73.6
Percent potentially prime   19.9   12.1   33.9
Initial interest rate   7.99   8.03   7.92
Current interest rate   8.62   9.01   7.92
NOTES: Figures are as of Dec. 31, 2007. FICO scores, LTV ratios and second-lien percentages are at time of origination. Potentially prime 
mortgages are loans that at time of origination had less than 80 percent LTV, full documentation and a FICO score of at least 620 and 
were “owner occupied.”
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations from First American LoanPerformance data.
Making Bankable Loans
Rules and regulations require banking in-
stitutions, regardless of CRA standing, to make 
loans that are “bankable”—likely to be repaid 
according to the terms—and consistent with 
safe and sound banking practices.
Past debt-to-income level, loan payment 
performance, collateral, net worth and liquidity 
are all part of a loan applicant’s qualities and 
determine the likelihood of payment. Race and 
ethnicity do not factor into creditworthiness. 
If the potential borrower does not meet all 
of the criteria, the bank must lower its risk ex-
posure before making the loan—for example, 
by obtaining credit enhancements.8
Subprime Mortgage Loans
Subprime mortgage loans are designed 
for borrowers who do not qualify for prime 
mortgages (Table 1).9 
Subprime loans are more expensive than 
prime loans because of the higher risk of 
default. Relative to borrowers who qualify for 
prime credit, subprime borrowers have lower 
FICO credit scores, higher debt-to-income 
ratios, insufficient cash for down payments or a 
combination of these risk factors. 
More than half of subprime mortgages 
have adjustable rates. Subprime adjustable-rate 
loans typically have an initial period of two 
to three years of fixed payments, followed by 
variable payments (for example, the so-called 
2/28 and 3/27 mortgages).
Not all borrowers of subprime loans quali-
fied only for this type of loan. Some qualified 
for prime credit but were steered into subprime 
loans or chose them. 
Many mortgage lenders and brokers did 
not make bankable loans. They failed to verify 
borrowers’ income, charged borrowers exces-
sive interest rates and fees, and conducted 
other poor lending practices. In effect, they set 
up many borrowers for failure.
It’s important to note that subprime loans 
are not necessarily nonbankable or “predatory” 
loans. A majority of subprime borrowers are 
making their payments, building wealth and 
participating in the American dream.10 
Abuses in Subprime Housing Market 
The subprime market took off in the late 
1990s. By 2006, the market had surpassed $600 
billion and accounted for one-fifth of mortgage 
originations. Independent mortgage companies 
made 46 percent of these loans; banks and 
thrifts made 29 percent. Affiliates and subsidiar-
ies of banks and thrifts made the remaining 25 
percent.11
While subprime lending existed be-
fore the 1990s, the flagrant and widespread 
abuses in this market did not occur until the 
late 1990s. The originate-to-distribute model 
presented the opportunity for independent 
lending institutions and mortgage brokers to 
make substantial profits. In this model, origina-
tors sell, or “distribute,” loans to the secondary 
market and have less incentive to scrutinize the 
riskiness of these loans than if they keep them. 
Their income and fees are based on volume of 
loans sold, so their focus is on quantity. Before 
the subprime market fell, securities backed by 
these loans yielded high returns and were thus 
appealing to many investors. 
In this market, serious delinquencies and 
foreclosures began to edge up nationwide in 
2006 and shot up in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 1). 
There appears to be a direct correlation 
between the quality of subprime loans and the 
degree of regulatory oversight. Nondepository 
mortgage providers such as mortgage lenders 
and brokers are regulated by 50 different state 
banking supervisors instead of a federal body 
responsible for comprehensive oversight. Comp-
troller of the Currency John Dugan reported that 
these companies “originated the overwhelming 
preponderance of toxic subprime mortgages” 
and these loans “account for a disproportionate 
percentage of defaults and foreclosures nation-
wide, with glaring examples in the metropolitan 
areas hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis.”12
By 2006, the subprime market 
had surpassed $600 billion and  
accounted for one-fifth of  
mortgage originations. 
Independent mortgage  
companies made 46 percent  
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SOURCE: Mortgage Bankers Association/Haver Analytics.
Other factors helped create the perfect 
storm. Credit scoring systems may have been 
inadequate to accurately assess credit risk.13 
The unusually high rate of housing apprecia-
tion gave borrowers extra financial cushioning 
through increased equity. And the array of 
financing options was confusing for many bor-
rowers trying to match a loan product to their 
financial situation.
CRA Analysis
The Federal Reserve Board researched 
whether the CRA played a substantial role in 
the subprime loan crisis. Its staff analysis of 
2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data and other sources concludes that the CRA 
did not contribute to or cause this crisis.
According to the analysis:  
No major changes have been made to  •	
the CRA or its enforcement since 1995. 
The subprime crisis was triggered by 
poorly performing mortgage loans orig-
inated between 2004 and 2007. This 
chronological gap weakens the conten-
tion that the CRA is a major cause of the 
crisis.
Contrary to the widely held percep- •	
tion that most higher-priced loans were 
made to lower-income groups targeted 
by the CRA, 55 percent of higher-priced 
loan originations went to middle- and 
upper-income borrowers or borrowers 
in middle- and upper-income neighbor-
hoods in 2005 and 2006.14
Only 6 percent of higher-priced loan  •	
originations made by banking institu-
tions and their affiliates in 2005 and 2006 
went to lower-income borrowers or  
borrowers in lower-income neighbor-
hoods within CRA assessment areas 
(Table 2).15 This was calculated by taking 
the number of higher-priced lower- 
income loans made by banks and af-
filiates in their assessment areas and 
dividing it by the total number of higher-
priced loans made by these institutions. 
If the proportion were high, it would 
suggest that banks were trying to origi-
nate a large percentage of higher-priced 
lower-income loans in areas that would 
earn them CRA credit. The result sug-
gests that banks were not trying to target 
these areas.
Mortgage purchase data counter the  •	
notion that the CRA indirectly created 
an incentive for independent mortgage 
companies to make higher-priced lower-
income loans. In 2006, banking institu-
tions bought only about 9 percent of 
independent mortgage companies’ loans; 
15 percent of those loans were higher-
priced loans to lower-income borrowers 
or neighborhoods.16
The CRA does not appear to have an  •	
impact on delinquencies. The Board re-
port compared 90-day-plus delinquency 
rates of subprime and Alt-A loans in ZIP 
codes just above and below the CRA 
eligibility threshold.17 If the rates were 
different between these types of ZIP 
codes, the data would suggest that the 
Only 6 percent of higher-priced 
loan originations made by banks 
and their affiliates in 2005 and 
2006 went to lower-income  
borrowers or borrowers in lower-
income neighborhoods within 
CRA assessment areas.
Table 2
Share of Higher-Priced Mortgage Originations in 2005–06 (percent)
Banking institutions and affiliates
Independent  
mortgage  
companies  Total 
Borrower  
characteristic
In CRA  
assessment area
Outside CRA  
assessment area
Lower income 6 17 22 45
Non-lower income 7 20 28 55
Total 13 38 50 100
NOTES: Totals may not add up due to rounding. Calculations based on first-lien, conventional, site-built home purchase and refinance 
originations reported as higher-priced under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
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Table 4
90-Day-Plus Delinquency Rates by ZIP Code (percent)
ZIP codes Subprime Alt-A Total
Lower income 25.0 16.1 21.5
Middle income 21.3 12.9 17.7
Higher income 19.5 10.9 14.5
NOTES: Data based on mortgages originated between January 2006 and April 2008. Delinquency rates as of August 2008. 
SOURCE: Delinquency data from First American LoanPerformance.
CRA might have an effect on delinquency 
rates. The rates were almost identical 
(Table 3).
Delinquency rates were high across all  •	
neighborhoods, not just those that were 
lower income (Table 4). While 90-day-
plus delinquency rates of lower-income 
neighborhoods were the highest, these 
ZIP codes accounted for a relatively 
small share of all households—about 
one-fifth.18 So, the incidence of foreclo-
sure may be quite high in lower-income 
areas but not be a major contributor to 
the national foreclosure crisis.19
CRA’s Positive Role 
In the years ahead, low- and moderate-
income households and the growing number 
of financially fragile households can benefit 
from the CRA because it helps attract safe and 
sound lending and spurs competition in their 
neighborhoods. 
University of Michigan law professor 
Michael Barr, who has written extensively on 
financial services and low- and moderate-
income households, said in testimony before 
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Financial Services in 2008:20
 “In some ways, CRA is well positioned 
to help overcome the bifurcation between the 
prime and subprime markets by enhancing 
competition from banks and thrifts … [this] 
would improve market efficiency, reduce racial 
discrimination, and speed the process of cor-
recting other market failures. Competition …
can help to drive out abusive practices and 
improve price transparency in these markets.” 
From a broader perspective, the CRA can 
help stabilize and strengthen the economy. 
For example, small-business loans reported 
under the CRA totaled $2.5 trillion from 1998 
through 2007. According to the Small Busi-
ness Administration, firms with fewer than 
500 employees accounted for more than half 
of nonfarm private gross domestic product 
and 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually 
over the past decade.21
Moreover, data from the Board’s staff 
report suggest that the CRA prevented the 
subprime situation from being more severe.  
As shown in Table 2, only 6 percent of higher-
priced loans were made by CRA-regulated 
lenders to lower-income borrowers or neigh-
borhoods inside their assessment areas, in 
contrast to 17 percent outside of these areas.
A recent analysis of 2006 HMDA data 
from the country’s 15 largest metropolitan 
areas compared loans originated by banks in 
their CRA assessment areas with loans made 
by other lenders in each of these markets.22 
Among the findings, these banks were 
significantly less likely to make high-cost 
loans—and high-cost loans to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers—than other 
lenders. Banks lending in their CRA assess-
ment areas were twice as likely as other 
lenders to keep the loans they originated. 
And there was a strong negative correlation 
between a metropolitan area’s concentration 
of bank branches and its foreclosure rate: the 
higher the concentration, the lower the rate. 
Together, these findings suggest that the CRA 
helped deter irresponsible lending.
Comptroller Dugan concludes that the 
CRA can continue to play a positive role in 
the housing market. As the credit market 
stabilizes, he says, CRA-driven initiatives can 
help with such challenges as the preservation 
of home  ownership opportunities and rental 
housing development. Opportunities also lie 
ahead for bank partnerships with nonprofits 
to help mitigate the impact of foreclosures in 
communities across the country.23
The economic crisis unveiled the vulner-
abilities of the nation’s financial system. Many 
laws and regulations—including the CRA—are 
under review as officials question how effec-
tive they are and can be in making the system 
stronger, more resilient and inclusive. 
In an effort to foster constructive debate, 
the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San 
Francisco recently issued a report, Revisit-
ing the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the 
Community Reinvestment Act, that examines 
the CRA’s evolution and highlights possible 
reforms. The report can be found at  
www.bos.frb.org/commdev/cra/index.htm.
Table 3
90-Day-Plus Delinquency Rates for ZIP Codes Just Above  
and Below CRA Threshold (percent)
ZIP codes Subprime Alt-A Total
Just above threshold 24.9 15.4 21.0
Just below threshold 24.1 15.6 20.7
NOTES: Data based on mortgages originated between January 2006 and April 2008. Delinquency rates as of August 2008.
SOURCE: Delinquency data from First American LoanPerformance.
In the years ahead,  
communities can benefit from  
the CRA because it helps  
attract safe and sound lending 
and spurs competition in their  
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